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 The banking sectors of the transition countries have progressed remarkably in the 
last 15 years.  In fact, banking in most transition countries has largely shaken off the 
traumas of the transition era.  At the start of the 21st century banks in these countries 
looks very much like banks elsewhere. That is they are by no means problem free but 
they are struggling with the same issues as banks in other emerging market countries.  
There have been a surprisingly large number of studies that have told us about the 
performance of these banks but we know very little about their risk taking behavior and 
how the banking environment influences it.  
 
 In this paper we examine risk taking by banks in transition with information from 
the EBRD’s 2005 survey of bank managers1 and balance sheet and income data prepared 
by Bank Scope.   The institutional environment differs considerably among the countries 
in our sample. The Western European countries that joined the EU in 2004 were obliged 
to establish creditor rights and ensure proper law enforcement while many of the other 
countries were not exposed to these external pressures for reform. Thus, institutions in 
these countries offer, on average, less protection for lenders as compared to the new 
member states (see EBRD, Survey on Secured Transaction, 2004 and Pistor, 2000). In 
this paper, we examine the relationship between the institutional environment and 
risking-taking by banks.  
 
The role of financial intermediaries such as banks is to channel savings to 
investors.  In a modern economy, banks do this by maintaining a delicate balance 
between risk taking and managing risk.  Our aim here is to examine the link between 
banks’ risk-taking and risk management activities and the quality of the institutional 
environment.  An examination of the relationship is interesting because theory is 
ambiguous about its direction.  We can demonstrate this by considering the role of 
collateral, a widely used mechanism for ameliorating risk. 
 
Bankers face information asymmetries when they engage in lending since only 
the borrowers know about the ‘true’ risk of their investment projects.  However, there are 
several covenants that bankers can include in their credit contracts to overcome 
information asymmetries. Bester (1986) showed that collateral can serve as a signaling 
device, so that borrowers reveal their true riskiness by the amount of collateral they are 
willing to offer. To ensure that devices like collateral can be effective, laws that define 
collateral relationships and adequate institutions for enforcement are essential.  More 
reliable collateral laws and arrangements could result in greater use of collateral to 
overcome asymmetric information and an overall reduction of risk.  In a poor legal 
environment,  a borrower might use the same asset as collateral in several lending 
agreements or might refuse to surrender the collateral in case of default. In this view, a 
better institutional environment will be associated with a greater willingness to use 
                                                 
1 The Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) was a random sampling of 
banks in 20 transition countries with a common questionnaire that was translated into 
each local language and presented to a senior bank officer in an interview (EBRD, 
Transition report, 2006, chapter 4). 
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collateralized loans and more lending.  This is consistent with results in the law and 
finance literature that show a positive relationship between good creditor rights and credit 
market development (La Porta, et. al. 1997, 1998, commonly called LLSV).  
 
However, Berger and Udell (2002), Berger, Klapper and Udell (2004) and 
Haselmann and Wachtel (2006) have shown that banks behave differently under different 
institutional settings. For example, Berger and Udell (2002) find that banks are more 
willing to provide financing to information opaque borrowers in a better legal system.  
That is, with reliable collateral arrangements, banks will lend to more risky borrowers 
even if ‘hard’ information such as audited financial statements are unavailable. In this 
view, improvements in the institutional environment are associated with greater risk 
taking by banks.  
 
We find no indication of excessive risk taking by any specific group of transition 
banks.  Overall banking markets in transition economies are relatively homogenous with 
only small differences among the average bank operating in different regions, belonging 
to different ownership groups or having a different size. Interestingly, we find no 
connection between the level of risk banks take and the institutional environment they 
operate in. Nevertheless, banks that operate in an unsound environment generally 
maintain a higher level of capital. Furthermore, banks with higher risk measures 
compared to their competitors also do more risk management activities. This suggests 
that banks in transition economies have learned how to manage their risks by now. 
 
 Section I discusses the relationship between the banking environment and risk 
taking, as well as the relevant literature.  The next section presents the bank data and the 
relationship of bank performance to ownership and size.  Our measures of bank risk are 
presented in section III. The relationship between risk and bank characteristics is 
discussed in section IV.  In section V we relate bank risk measures to risk management 
activities and specific types of risk taking.  Finally, conclusions are in section VI. 
 
I. The banking environment in transition    
 
 Banking in the transition countries has quickly passed through four stages (see 
Bonin and Wachtel, 2003).   The first stage of banking development in the transition 
economies involved the establishment of banking institutions in the early 1990s.  During 
the planned economy era, the only financial institutions were adjuncts of the state 
mechanism and banking in the contemporary sense of the word was largely unknown.  
Commercial banks were established as spin offs of the central bank payments system and 
new banks were chartered.  However, the role of these institutions was largely 
unchanged.  The state owned banks financed state owned enterprises and were soon 
insolvent.  The second stage of transition banking involved bank failures and systemic 
crises that affected every transition economy in the middle of the 1990s (see Bonin and 
Wachtel, 2005).  The third stage involved a lengthy process of restructuring through 
privatization and the entry of foreign banks.  By the end of the century, most banks were 
privately owned and in virtually all of the transition countries foreign banks 
predominated.  The fourth stage brings us to the present.  In most transition economies 
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banks are largely sound, appropriately regulated and competitive institutions.  Banking in 
transition has largely shaken off its planned economy heritage. 
 
Although research on banking on transition is fairly extensive, the issues of risk 
taking and risk management remain unexamined.  The earliest studies of banking in 
transition focused on the creation and design of banking institutions (see for example 
Corbet and Mayer, 1992 and Udell and Wachtel, 1995).  As the transition proceeded, 
research interest turned to bank performance (see for example Fries, Neven, Seabright 
and Taci 2006, and Claeys and Van der Vennet, 2003) and, later on, bank efficiency 
(Fries and Taci, 2005, Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel 2005a, and Weil, 2003).  More 
recently, research examined the banking crisis, restructurings and privatizations that 
characterized transition (see for example Tang, Zoli and Klytchnikova, 2000, Bonin and 
Wachtel, 2005 and Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005b).  Finally, de Haas and Lelyveld 
(2006) and Haselmann (2006) focus on the consequences of foreign banking penetration 
on banking sector stability. 
    
Studies on risk taking and risk management by banks in transition economies are 
rare because data on specific banking activities are limited.2  Schardax and Reininger 
(2001) examine the vulnerability to financial contagion of the financial sectors in 
transition economies at the macroeconomic level.  Focusing more on individual banks, 
Kager (2002) shows that the problem of bad loans persisted in many banks in transition 
economies.  
 
II. Bank data and bank performance 
 
 The BEPS survey was based on a random sample of 423 banks in 20 countries 
(with an over sampling of banks in the smaller countries and also in Russia).  The 
response rate was 50% but it rises to 63% when Russia is excluded.  The countries with 
the lowest response rates were in addition to Russia, the Ukraine and also Hungary and 
the Czech Republic.3 Each bank was linked to the Bank Scope (2006) data after a careful 
examination to make sure that the correct Bank Scope data was used.  That is, care was 
taken to make sure that the Bank Scope data used had the proper bank identification and 
level of consolidation.4  When the Bank Scope data for the entire sample frame was 
compared to the data for the banks that responded to the survey, there was no indication 
of systematic response bias.5  Sample sizes in the analysis are somewhat smaller than the 
                                                 
2 The Bank Scope data generally only include aggregate balance sheet items. 
3 Successful bankers in the advanced transition countries might have been less inclined to 
set aside the time for an EBRD interview than others. In the tense environment in Russia 
and the Ukraine bankers might have had other reasons to avoid responding. 
4 The Bank Scope data were checked for anomalies. Several corrections were made using 
information provided by the banks in the survey and one bank in Serbia was eliminated.  
The Bank Scope data set was prepared with the help of Dr. Anita Taci of the EBRD. 
5  In most countries the average asset level and the return on assets are about the same for 
responding and non-responding banks. The correlation of the average country ROAs 
from full sample and from the survey respondents is 0.97 and the rank correlation is 0.76.    
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number of survey respondents because Bank Scope does not provide data for a few banks 
that responded to the survey and survey respondents often did not provide answers to all 
the questions.6 
 
 In order to relate bank risk to the banking environment we use both objective 
institutional indicators of the environment and indicators based on the banks’ own 
assessments as provided in the BEPS survey. The objective measures are based on the 
EBRD Legal Transition Program (LTP) evaluations of each country’s legal system 
relating to secured transactions. The first indicator is an index of the quality of collateral 
law (LTP – Quality) and the second is an index of the quality of law enforcement (LTP – 
Enforcement). The component questions for each index are found in Haselmann and 
Wachtel (2006). 
 
The BEPS survey asked bank managers about their perceptions of collateral laws, 
and the quality of law enforcement and bank regulation.  In each instance the survey 
respondent was asked for his or her opinions on several relevant criteria and the 
responses were aggregated into an overall index that measures their confidence in the 
banking environment.  Three perceptions indexes based on BEPS were constructed (see 
Hoshi, 2006, for similar indices with these data). The first two measure perceptions of the 
quality of the laws regarding collateral on movable assets and collateral on immovable 
assets. The third measures their confidence in the ability of the court system to resolve 
disputes.  
 
All of the banking environment indices are sums of several subjective survey 
responses and thus provide an ordinal ranking rather than a meaningful measure of 
intensity. Therefore, we divide the legal indicators into below and above median groups 
to differentiate among banks with lesser and greater confidence in the environment.   
 
Summary statistics for the banks in our data set are shown in Table 1. Means for 
common performance measures are shown for the whole sample and several sub-groups. 
To begin, we distinguish among three bank ownership groups using BEPS information to 
determine majority ownership.7   Bank ownership is important for several reasons. First, 
                                                 
6 The survey design included all banks in the country, which might include some 
institutions that are not picked up by Bank Scope. There were 17 respondent banks 
excluded because there was not adequate Bank Scope data for 2004 in Moldova, 3 in 
Macedonia, 3 in Belarus, 2 in Slovakia and 1 in each of Bosnia, Bulgaria, Poland, Serbia, 
and Ukraine.  One additional Serbian bank is eliminated because of inconsistencies in the 
Bank Scope data. 
7  Only 8% of the banks were government owned at the time of the survey. The 
privatization process was largely completed and even banks that reverted to government 
ownership during banking crises in the late 1990s (e.g. in Romania and Croatia) had been 
privatized when the survey was conducted in 2005. Fully 54% of the respondent banks 
are foreign and that number proportion would be much higher if the FSU were excluded.  
The foreign banks include both greenfield banks and banks acquired by mergers and 
acquisitions. 
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government banks might still face soft budget constraints that affect their willingness to 
take on risk. Second, private domestic and foreign owned banks will also have different 
risk profiles.  Foreign banks are likely to have less local expertise or ‘soft’ information 
that enables banks to reduce risk through customer relationships.   
 
Next, differences in transition progress will affect risk characteristics of banks. 
Since the number of respondent banks in many countries is quite small, a comparison of 
country averages is not particularly informative. Instead, we show the means for three 
country groups: the transition countries that are now members of the European Union 
(EU), the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) with the exception of the Baltic 
countries which are already part of the EU, and the countries of south Eastern Europe 
(SEE).8   Finally, we group the banks into three size groups with roughly about a third of 
the banks in each group: assets less than $200 million, between $200 million and $1 
billion and in excess of $1 billion.  Since the largest banks tend to be concentrated in 
larger countries, we also group the banks by their share of aggregate domestic credit in 
the country where they are located.9  Many of the banks in our dataset have a small 
market share; 42% are in the smallest share category and only 16% in largest share 
category.   
 
Foreign and domestic banks perform similarly and both out perform the 
government banks. The government banks are on average twice the size of foreign banks 
and the domestic banks are on average much smaller.  The return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE) are negative for the government owned banks and about the same 
for the foreign and domestic banks.  Similarly, net interest margins (NIM) are smaller for 
the government banks and about the same for the others. The few banks that are still state 
owned are in very poor shape, although efforts are underway to improve accounting 
standards and make them ready for privatization.  
 
Average return on assets is quite similar across the three regions.  Return on 
equity is about the same in the EU and FSU but lower in SEE.  Net interest margins 
(NIM) are much lower in the EU countries than elsewhere. Banks in the SEE countries 
are considerably smaller according to asset size than banks in the other two regions. 
Grouping our sample by assets or by market share yields similar conclusions.  Smaller 
banks have a lower ROA and ROE compared to their larger competitors. 
 
                                                 
8 The BEPS respondents are about evenly divided among the regions (29% are from the 
FSU and about 35% from each of the other regions). The countries in each region are: 
EU: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
FSU: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine 
SEE: Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia. 
9 Domestic credit (IMF IFS line 32) includes credit from non-bank sources as well; so 
small shares are expected even when we know that banking is highly concentrated.  
Further, no domestic credit measure was available for Serbia; so Serbian banks are 
excluded from market share analyses, as are banks that did not report assets to Bank 
Scope. 
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III. Measuring bank risk 
 
 As noted earlier, banking is the business of balancing risk taking and risk 
management.  However, there is no ideal single measure of risk and, in fact, there any 
number of measures.  We will consider three approaches to risk measurement.  First, we 
present accounting measures that utilize various balance sheet ratios that are standard 
indicators of riskiness.  Second, we will use out of sample forecasts from a default 
probability model to predict the default probability for each bank in our sample.  Finally, 
we offer Basel type risk measures based on each bank’s asset composition.  
 
 Accounting risk measures. The Bank Scope data are used to construct standard 
accounting measures of risk activity. We examine the following balance sheet ratios to 
describe the risk taking behavior of banks:  
 
Name Definition 
  
Solvency Equity / assets 
Liquidity Liquid assets (Deposits with banks + treasury bills) / 
assets 
Custdepo Customer deposits / assets 
Contliab Contingent liabilities / assets 
Loan Total customer loans / assets 
Loanloss Loan loss reserves / customer loans 
Shortloans Short-term loans / customer loans 
 
The default probability model.  Estimation of a default probability (DPM) model 
requires a sample that includes default experiences.  Since the BEPS survey (conducted 
in 2005) does not include failed banks, we estimated the model with a different data set 
and applied the estimates to the banks in our sample to obtain out of sample forecasts of 
default probability.   
 
The basic idea of a DPM is to predict whether a bank will default with the help of 
different accounting and macro measures. The model estimated here is based on a 
different sample of banks (including, of course, those that failed) and a somewhat 
different group of transition countries.  We use these results to make out of sample 
estimates of default probabilities for the banks in our sample.10  
 
The data consists of all banks in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and 
Poland from the period of 1994 until 2002. In order to determine whether a bank has 
defaulted further information from Bankers Almanac was collected for each bank. Once a 
bank has been characterized as defaulted, the actual years of default as well as the two 
                                                 
10 Our intention is to develop a simple DPM that can be used for out of sample forecasts 
rather than fully investigate the specification of such models.   
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previous periods are classified as defaulted. All other observations for a defaulted bank 
are excluded from the sample in order to prevent any bias.11   
 
The logit model has been widely used to estimate bank default probability.12  It 
can be written as:  
 
∑
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where i indexes the bank year observations and j the proximate determinants of default. 
In the above equation, L is a binary variable, taking the value of one if a bank defaulted 
and zero otherwise. The probability function is described by p (L). For estimating p (L) 
an empirically not observable latent variable z is introduced that is determined by the 
independent variables Xij. Thus, a linear relationship is assumed for the determination of 
z, however, not for the estimation of p (L).  
 
The variables in Xij include measures of the risks that a bank faces, which include 
credit risk, market risk, operational risk and liquidity risk.13  Specifically, the variables Xij 
in our model along with their expected effect on default probability are: 
Credit risk measures:   Equity / assets     - 
    Loan loss reserves / loans   + 
    Loans / assts     + 
Market risk measure:  Net interest margin / assets    - 
Operations risk measure: Personnel expenses / operational expenses - 
Liquidity risk measures: Short term deposits / assets   + 
    Liquid assets / assets    - 
    Loans / deposits    + 
General risk measures: Net income / assets    - 
     Net income / equity    - 
Bank characteristics:  Log of assets     - 
    Customer deposits / assets   + 
 
The multivariate model was estimated with a rolling forward routine to exclude 
insignificant variables. The final model included six independent variables and all except 
the loan to asset ratio have the expected sign.  The Nagelkerke R-squared, which 
estimates the explained variance of the dependent variable by the independent variables, 
is above 40%. The variables and coefficient estimates of the final model are:  
Constant       10.071 
                                                 
11 There are in total 631 bank year observations of which 36 represent banks in default. 
For a detailed description of the underlying dataset see Haselmann (2006). 
12 The main advantage of logit models over other methods is that no strict assumptions 
are imposed on the estimation. Furthermore, the results can be directly interpreted as 
default probabilities.  
13 For different specifications of DPMs with accounting measures and other data see for 
example Claeys and Schoors (forthcoming) who use Russian data. 
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Loan loss reserves / loans       4.641 
Loans / assets     -16.122 
Personnel expenses / operational expenses   -2.209 
Liquid assets / assets    -19.909  
Log of assets       -1.218 
Customer deposits / assets       9.545 
 
In order to further evaluate the underlying model, we examine the accuracy of the 
model predictions. There are two types of possible prediction errors. First, a bank that has 
actually defaulted might be classified as non-defaulted by the model (a type I error). As 
shown below, 28 of the 36 problem bank year observations (78%) have been correctly 
detected.  Second, there is the possibility that a healthy bank will be classified as 
defaulted (a type II error).  95% of the 595 non-defaulted bank year observations are 
classified as such.  
 
While the overall fit of the model is extremely high, the question of applicability 
of these results to the broader set of countries and later time period of the EBRD survey 
remains.  In order to answer this question, we examine the influence of year and country 
specific controls in the estimated DPM.  That is, the model was estimated with year fixed 
effects and three country level macro variables (the ratio of private credit to GDP, GDP 
growth and interest rate spreads).  The results show that only the ratio of private credit to 
GDP turns out to have a significant effect on the banks default probability. The 
magnitude of this coefficient is, however, in relationship to the coefficients of the bank 
specific variables rather small and the overall detection rate of the model including macro 
and year controls decreases. Therefore, we concluded that the estimation of default 
probability is not specific to the countries or years included in the sample, but to 
measures describing the conditions of the individual banks. Thus, we apply the 
coefficients from the DPM shown above to obtain default probabilities for the banks in 
the BEPS sample.  
 
Risk adjusted assets and credit risk.  Finally, the EBRD questionnaire asked banks 
to provide more detailed information about the characteristics of their assets than can be 
found in Bank Scope.  This information is used to construct two risk measures: a credit 
risk measure that uses risk weights like those found in the Basle agreements and also a 
measure of risk adjusted assets.14 
                                                 
14  The familiar Basle measure is the ratio of capital to risk adjusted assets.  The well 
known minimum capital requirement is that the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk adjusted 
assets should be at least 8%. The Basle criterion is our credit risk measure (assets to risk 
adjusted assets) multiplied by the capital asset ratio. The credit risk ratio can be 
Percentage of
No-default Default correct prediction
Observed
No-default 566 29 95.1%
Default 8 28 77.8%
Overall 94.1%
Predicted
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 The BEPS survey provides a breakdown of assets by type that is more detailed 
than the classifications available in Bank Scope.  We use this information to construct 
risk adjusted assets, ∑ wiAi where Ai is the holdings of the i-th asset category and wi   is 
the risk weight for that asset category.  The risk weights are based on the Basel II risk 
buckets although the available categories do not match the Basel definitions exactly.  The 
weights assigned are in the spirit of the Basel agreement and are a reasonable 
approximation. The asset categories and the risk weights assigned are: 
Mortgage loans          50% 
Other household borrowing      100 
Loans to small corporations     100 
Loans to medium corporations        75 
Loans to domestic subsidies of foreign corporations    20 
Loans to state owned enterprises      20 
Loans to government or government agencies    10 
All other assets      100 
 
We construct two risk measures using the risk adjusted assets.  First, our measure 
of credit risk is the ratio of risk adjusted asset to total assets:   
CR= ∑ wiAi/A 
Second, we will examine a risk adjusted capital adequacy measure, which is the ratio of 
capital to risk adjusted assets. 
 
 
IV. Bank risk, region, ownership and size 
 
 Table 2 provides the means for bank groups of the various risk measures.  It starts 
with balance sheet measures based on Bank Scope data for 2004.  The first five columns 
show ratios to total bank assets for equity (solvency), liquid  assets, customer deposits, 
contingent liabilities and loans.  The next two columns provide the ratio of loan loss 
reserves to total loans followed by short term loans to total loans.  Many banks fail to 
report contingent liabilities and only about half provide the break down of loans between 
short and long term.  The default probability predicted by the model in the previous 
section is next. The last three columns provide capital adequacy measures that use BEPS 
data. First is the Tier I capital ratio which was only reported by about one-half the bank 
respondents.  It is followed by the credit risk measure and, finally, the ratio of capital to 
risk adjusted assets where risk adjusted assets are based on the Basle type weights 
described above.    
 
 There are some noticeable differences in balance sheet characteristics among bank 
ownership groups and across regions as well.  The government banks have more capital, 
larger loan loss reserves and more short term loans than the others.  The domestic banks 
                                                                                                                                                 
constructed for all respondent banks because it does not rely on Bank Scope data.  
Further many additional banks do not provide data on capital in Bank Scope. 
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make less use of contingent liabilities and are less liquid while the foreign banks maintain 
less equity than the others.  
 
EU banks have smaller solvency ratios and loan loss reserves but they maintain 
more liquid assets.  The use of contingent liabilities is rare except for EU region banks. 
Finally, there are some differences by bank size or share. There is clearly an inverse 
relationship between the solvency ratio and bank size or market share.  Also, the very 
large banks and those with shares over 10% make fewer short term loans than others.   
 
 The estimated default probability summarizes the risk characteristics of the 
balance sheet. It is lower among EU banks, foreign banks and large banks (both size and 
share).  Reported Tier I capital is very high for all bank types. Although the credit risk 
measure is widely dispersed overall, the means for all of the bank type groups are very 
similar.  There is some variation with bank size; credit risk is higher for small banks, 
since these banks generally provide a larger fraction of SME lending. The capital to risk 
adjusted assets varies in the same way (just more so) than the Tier I capital to asset ratio. 
Government, SEE and small banks have a considerably higher capital to risk adjutsted 
asset ratio than their competitors which might well reflect a desire to signal their 
creditworthiness.  
 
V. Bank risk and the banking environment 
 
The differences in bank risk by bank type discussed in the previous section are 
generally not large.  A bank’s taste for risk might well be independent of its size, 
ownership and even location and depends instead on its perceptions of the banking 
environment.  Banks with greater confidence in the banking environment or in countries 
with an objectively better legal environment for banking might be willing to take on more 
risk.    
 
 In order to test this presumption we present means of our risk measures grouped 
by the institutional indicators in Table 3.  We examine how average bank risk differs 
between those with below median and above median quality of law or perceptions of the 
legal environment. Interestingly, there is no clear pattern between estimated default 
probability and the institutional environment. When bankers have better perceptions of 
the quality of law and when the laws are objectively better their default probability is 
higher. This suggests that bankers are willing to take on risky lending when the legal 
environment for dealing with bad loans is better. However, better perceptions of the 
courts and better law enforcement are associated with lower default probabilities. Also no 
clear pattern could be detected for the relationship between bank risk and credit risk.  
 
On the other hand, we can find a clear pattern for the relationship between our 
capital risk adjusted assets ratio, solvency and institutional environment. By all our 
indicators no matter whether they are based on subjective surveys or bankers’ own 
perception show that banks that operate in a poor environment tend to keep a higher 
capital risk adjusted assets and solvency ratio. Results for the Tier 1 capital support this 
conclusion. The data leads us to conclude that the legal environment itself does not 
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influence the banks’ overall riskiness.15  However, banks respond to their environment by 
adjusting their own capital.   In Haselmann and Wachtel (2006) we show that differences 
in the legal environment effect the composition of loan portfolio. 
 
 Previous findings are supported when we use the actual index values as 
continuous variables.  Correlations of the quality indexes and the bank risk measures as 
presented below yield some interesting observations.  There are consistently negative 
relationships between the quality of the environment and measures of bank capital (the 
Tier I ratio, capital to risk adjusted assets ration and solvency). Credit risk and default 
probability do not exhibit a consistent pattern with the indexes of the quality of the 
banking environment. 
 
  Tier1 Credit 
risk 
Capital 
assets 
Default Solvency Liquidity 
LTP Law of the 
book 
-0.068 0.012 -0.209 0.166 -0.160 0.069 
LTP Enforcement of 
law 
-0.155 -0.128 -0.229 -0.052 -0.209 0.137 
BEPS Perception of 
law on movable 
assets 
-0.311 0.034 -0.339 -0.030 -0.249 0.091 
BEPS Perception of 
law on immovable 
assets 
-0.131 0.023 -0.184 0.087 -0.110 0.109 
BEPS - Court 
perception 
-0.024 -0.003 -0.072 0.012 0.012 0.080 
Correlation coefficients of risk measures and institutional variables 
  
 
Panel I from Table 4 reports the relationship between further characteristics of a 
bank’s environment and our risk measures. BEPS collected information about the banks 
access to credit registry and risk management activities of banks. Banks that have access 
to a credit registry show a considerable lower default probability than banks that have no 
access. If such a credit registry exists, the bankers’ assessment about the reliability of the 
registry seems of minor importance.  
 
In Panel II of the same table we turn to the relationship between risk and the 
banker’s reported risk management behavior.  Generally banks with active risk 
management show a higher default probability (except to those banks that have an 
internal risk rating system). However, banks that manage their risk more actively are 
mostly more solvent, liquid and have a higher capital risk adjusted asset ratio.  
 
  Overall, evidence for a relationship between banks’ risk and their institutional 
environment is not very strong with one exception. Banks that have access to a credit 
registry clearly show a lower probability of default. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
                                                 
15  In contrast, Claeys and Van der Vennet (2003) indicate that reform, as measured by the 
EBRD transition indicators, is associated with an increase in bank risk. 
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the institutional setting is unrelated to banking risk. One reason for our finding could be 
the specific nature of banking risk. Bank lending involves uncertainty and an efficiently 
functioning bank needs to take on risks. Under bad institutional settings, banks are less 
active lenders (e.g. Qian and Strahan, forthcoming, and Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2006) 
and mostly lend to borrowers about whom they can easily obtain information like large 
enterprises and the government (see Haselmann and Wachtel 2006).  Such lending is, 
however, less risky than lending to information opaque borrowers like households and 
SMEs. This could explain why we do not find a clear pattern between a solid institutional 
environment and banks’ probability of default. 
 
On the other hand, we find that those banks that operate in an unsound 
environment have more capital. This finding shows that banks adapt to their environment 
by adjusting their capital. Furthermore, banks that take on more risk also actively manage 
their risk by creating a risk management department or obtaining credit histories from 
their borrowers. These findings suggest that banks are aware about the level of risk they 
take on.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
For the first time, data are available to examine the risk taking and risk 
management behavior of transition banks.  In this paper we relate various measures of 
bank risk – solvency, liquidity, default probability and credit risk among others – to the 
size, location, ownership, institutional settings and management characteristics of banks. 
The following three points summarize our findings: 
   
• Certain groups of banks differ in their riskiness; e.g. foreign, EU and large 
banks show a lower probability of default compared to their competitors. 
Nevertheless, these differences are not large and generally not statistically 
significant. This suggests that banking markets are relatively homogenous 
and no clear groups of banks with excessive risk taking can be identified. 
• We find no clear relationship between banks’ risk taking and their 
institutional environment (with banks’ access to a credit registry being an 
exception). Our findings do, however, suggest that banks that operate in an 
unsound institutional environment respond to their situation by holding 
more capital and taking less credit risk. 
• Banks that take on more risk also actively manage their risk by, for 
example, establishing a risk management department or obtaining 
information on borrowers’ histories. Such banks also tend to hold more 
capital. 
 
Overall we find that no group of banks is subject to excessive risk taking and that 
those banks that take on risks also take on a higher share of capital and undertake active 
risk management. Thus, we conclude that the transition banks in our sample seem to 
basically operate and mange risk as banks in other developed markets.  
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ROA ROE NIM Assets  
Total Sample mean 0.014 0.115 0.051 19617
obs 194 191 193 212
Ownership groups
government mean -0.016 -0.017 0.035 44472
obs 16 16 16 18
domestic mean 0.018 0.129 0.051 10385
obs 68 66 67 80
foreign mean 0.016 0.126 0.053 21541
obs 110 109 110 114
Region groups
EU mean 0.013 0.138 0.039 36426
obs 71 71 71 72
FSU mean 0.019 0.143 0.060 11555
obs 49 47 48 62
SEE mean 0.011 0.074 0.056 8609
obs 74 73 74 78
Asset groups
0-200mill mean 0.007 0.042 0.057 1034
obs 55 53 54 63
200mill-1bill mean 0.017 0.105 0.061 5364
obs 73 72 73 83
>1bill mean 0.016 0.184 0.034 50304
obs 66 66 66 66
Market share groups
<2% mean 0.010 0.084 0.043 5766
obs 83 83 83 90
2%-10% mean 0.025 0.298 0.062 14147
obs 58 58 58 60
>10% mean 0.015 0.157 0.034 71279
obs 34 34 34 34  
 
Table 1: Means of performance measures by ownership, region, assets and market share, 
2004 
 
Notes: Assets in million of dollars.  
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Solvency Liquidity Custdepo Contliab Loan Loanloss Shortloans Default Tier1 Creditrisk Capitalassets
Total Sample 0.138 0.170 0.569 0.255 0.554 0.046 0.587 0.123 0.184 0.748 0.271
Ownership groups
government 0.195 0.180 0.562 0.282 0.547 0.091 0.689 0.158 0.358 0.722 0.641
domestic 0.151 0.153 0.587 0.130 0.545 0.049 0.583 0.154 0.185 0.770 0.239
foreign 0.122 0.178 0.559 0.336 0.560 0.037 0.566 0.106 0.167 0.735 0.239
Region groups
EU 0.103 0.234 0.562 0.518 0.512 0.027 0.540 0.100 0.126 0.739 0.181
FSU 0.150 0.091 0.536 0.080 0.597 0.046 0.651 0.139 0.182 0.728 0.286
SEE 0.164 0.159 0.596 0.119 0.567 0.062 0.578 0.142 0.237 0.760 0.316
Asset groups
0-200mill 0.223 0.177 0.563 0.106 0.549 0.067 0.611 0.173 0.261 0.781 0.339
200mill-1bill 0.121 0.176 0.554 0.226 0.558 0.037 0.681 0.129 0.158 0.751 0.205
>1bill 0.089 0.156 0.590 0.400 0.553 0.038 0.507 0.078 0.132 0.712 0.205
Market share groups
<2% 0.152 0.235 0.547 0.347 0.496 0.041 0.630 0.136 0.184 0.790 0.237
2%-10% 0.110 0.115 0.564 0.166 0.608 0.034 0.592 0.110 0.138 0.677 0.211
>10% 0.095 0.136 0.655 0.243 0.582 0.042 0.423 0.102 0.137 0.754 0.194  
 
Table 2: Means of risk measures by ownership, region, assets and market share, 2004 
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Tier1 Creditrisk Capitalassets Default Solvency Liquidity
LTP Qualtiy of law
Below median 0.190 0.743 0.286 0.105 0.148 0.156
Above median 0.198 0.750 0.251 0.153 0.122 0.206
LTP Enforcement of law
Below median 0.202 0.749 0.308 0.129 0.147 0.163
Above median 0.186 0.744 0.241 0.121 0.131 0.185
BEPS Perception of law on movable assets
Below median 0.223 0.740 0.324 0.109 0.169 0.163
Above median 0.158 0.755 0.210 0.142 0.113 0.204
BEPS Perception of law on immovable assets
Below median 0.213 0.736 0.321 0.094 0.151 0.176
Above median 0.175 0.752 0.227 0.146 0.134 0.187
BEPS - Court perception
Below median 0.211 0.757 0.305 0.132 0.152 0.166
Above median 0.173 0.735 0.238 0.102 0.135 0.184  
 
 
Table 3: Means of the bank risk measures grouped by legal indicators, 2004 
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Tier1 Creditrisk Capitalassets Default Solvency Liquidity
 I. Banks' environment
Does credit agency exist?
Yes 0.206 0.753 0.280 0.077 0.144 0.197
No 0.179 0.733 0.262 0.168 0.126 0.134
Is information of credit registry accurate and reliable
Yes 0.238 0.746 0.310 0.087 0.126 0.218
No 0.207 0.754 0.265 0.075 0.146 0.184
Loan applicants were rejected due to a lack of acceptable collateral
Yes 0.165 0.733 0.241 0.124 0.124 0.175
No 0.232 0.758 0.310 0.092 0.157 0.182
Lack of creditworthy customers was the main constraint on bank’s ability to make customer loans?
Yes 0.205 0.771 0.263 0.090 0.139 0.185
No 0.187 0.720 0.280 0.121 0.131 0.163
 II. Banks' risk management
Did your bank obtain information on credit histories of borrowers from credit information registries?
Yes 0.196 0.757 0.352 0.087 0.146 0.207
No 0.209 0.753 0.265 0.071 0.142 0.197
Did your bank have a separate department responsible for the risk management?
Yes 0.306 0.787 0.415 0.159 0.187 0.247
No 0.167 0.738 0.240 0.100 0.131 0.165
Does your bank measure the value at risk in its trading portfolio?
Yes 0.200 0.764 0.286 0.129 0.158 0.167
No 0.196 0.735 0.273 0.087 0.126 0.205
Has your bank an internal ratings based approach for the measurement of credit risk?
Yes 0.158 0.755 0.224 0.097 0.167 0.237
No 0.208 0.747 0.292 0.116 0.135 0.167  
 
Table 4: Means of the bank risk measures, 2004, grouped by BEPS management responses 
